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This article examines the concept of state-building as an imperative need in this 
globalizing world amidst the existence of fragile states around the world. It begins with 
a simple question regarding the challenges of state-building in fragile states and what 
measures can be done to minimalizethe probable negatives. Using secondary source 
analysis and twocase studiesof state-building in Afghanistan, Somaliland, and Aceh, 
this research finds that there are exclusively two overarching challenges to state-
building. First, there has been a challenge of coordination among different actors, as 
well as with the respective population in the relevant states; the second is the challenge 
of creating an effective exit strategy, such as maintaining stability and avoiding aid-
dependency after the state-building mission has been finished. 
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Artikel ini mengkaji konsep state-building sebagai kebutuhan penting di dunia yang 
mengglobal ini di tengah keberadaan negara-negara rawan di seluruh dunia. Artikel 
ini dimulai dengan pertanyaan sederhana mengenai tantangan state-building di 
negara-negara rawan dan langkah-langkah apa yang dapat dilakukan untuk 
meminimalkan kemungkinan-kemungkinan negatif. Dengan menggunakan analisis 
sumber sekunder dan sejumlah studi kasus pembangunan negara seperti di 
Afghanistan, Somaliland, maupun di Aceh, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa ada dua 
tantangan utama untuk membangun negara secara eksklusif. Pertama, ada tantangan 
koordinasi di antara para pelaku yang berbeda, serta terhadap populasi masing-
masing di negara yang relevan; yang kedua adalah tantangan menciptakan strategi 
keluar yang efektif, seperti menjaga stabilitas dan menghindari ketergantungan 
bantuan setelah misi pembangunan negara telah selesai. 
 





Harmonization does not necessarily always become the sole expected product of 
globalization. On the other flipside of the coin, theincreasingly globalizing world 
also means that one problem in a certain country would probably disturb the 
others if it were not anticipated carefully. Like contagious diseases, salient issues 
are now spreading in a transnational fashion, disregarding conventional national 
boundaries. Among the limitless issues which we are now facing in the world, the 
fragility of some states is among the problematic ones. The problem of fragile 
states has been perceived as an international issue, as it has the potential to be a 
spreadable problem. If not being managed carefully, fragile states can bring an 
opportunity for rebellious groups to seize the regime (Francois and Sud 2006, 
p.143). Fukuyama (2004) suggested that fragile states are the potential source of 
many problems, from “poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism” 
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(p.17). Today, the category of fragile states consists of states like Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen which are 
characterized by indicators such as uneven economic development, lack of 
legitimacy, and high level of demographic pressures (Messner 2019). Therefore, 
state-building is now considered a necessary international agenda. 
 
Regarding the state-building concept 
  
After all, we need to clarify what is being meant by state-building before moving 
even further to the next discussion. To put it simply, we can understand the idea 
of state-building as a “creation of new governmental institutions and the 
strengthening of existing ones” (Fukuyama 2004, p.17). In a broader term, Paris 
and Sisk (2009) defined state-building as a deeper form of peace-building which 
concentrates on improving security and development through the creation of a 
“capable, autonomous, and legitimate institution”. In another article, Chesterman 
(2004) mentioned that state-building can appear in five different variations, 
according to the relevant socio-political context. First, state-building can appear 
as a mission which is intended to prepare the independence of a certain country 
following its decolonization. Second, state-building can also mean a temporary 
administration to facilitate “the peaceful transfer of control” from the previous 
government to the existing government. Third, state-building can also be found 
asfacilitation toward an election of a certain state. Fourth, state-building can also 
be understood as a short-term government to facilitate the ongoing peace 
process. Lastly, Chesterman also defined state-building as a form of de facto 
administration by outside forces following the existing government‟s inability to 
govern (Chesterman 2004, p.57). 
 
Paris and Sisk (2009) write that modern state-building finds its root from the 
peacebuilding mechanisms done by the United Nations (UN). During the period 
of the Cold War, however, the peacebuilding operations were done in a 
conventional manner, without interfering in domestic affairs of the host country. 
It was after the end of the Cold War, peacebuilding has been revolutionized. Paris 
and Sisk argue that the revolution was a result of the unwillingness of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union to “maintain their previous levels of military 
and economic assistance to their clients” (p.4). As a result, the UN was obliged to 
involve directly in the process of conflict-settling. The first instance of this 
modern form of state-building was in 1989, where the UN assisted a post-conflict 
Namibia to prepare for elections and draft its new constitution. State-building is 
necessary, as peace-building alone is unable to remove the roots of the conflict—
one must also provide a precondition in which the newly-built society is able to 
settle their future disputes through peaceful means (Barnett and Zurcher 2009, 
p.23) 
 
On coordination: between agencies and the populace 
 
Putting it into practice, state-building missions are not flawless, as its process can 
also be hampered by various problems. This section tries to display some of the 
biggest challenges of the state-building process, and what measures can be done 
to minimalize such challenges. The author argues that there aretwo prominent 
challenges to state-building which this essay is going to focus on. The first one is 
the challenge of coordination among different actors, including the local 
population in the respective states. The second one, the author also perceives 
thatanother challenge is creating an effective exit strategy. The author argues that 
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state-building efforts are capable of creating such a comfort zone for the 
recipients, that they cannot escapethe case of aid-dependency after the state-
building mission has been finished.  
 
Yet the state-building projects always involve many stakeholders in their 
realization, the looming challenge which the author sees as one of the main 
problems is about coordination. There are two forms of coordination which are 
put into this discussion: first is the coordination among the agencies involved in 
the state-building process; second is the coordination with the population inside 
the state.  
 
Being thefirst challenge, coordination among the involved agencies is related to 
how each party in the state-building process understands their roles within the 
system. This first type of coordination matters, as it relates to the professionalism 
of such agencies in conducting the mission. To be perceived as legitimate, it is 
obvious that every agency involved should possess a good understanding of each 
other‟s roles, as well as a clear command of the mission. Moreover, a different 
form of agents may result in competing interests as well. In his article, Paris 
presented the examples of how peacebuilding in El Salvador, Mozambique, and 
Cambodia was disrupted by the contradictory policies between the UN and the 
IMF. On one side, the UN urged those countries to increase spending on peace-
building programs. However, the IMF urged those countries to do the opposite—
by suggesting fiscal restraint (Paris 2009, p.55). Such coordination problem will 
certainly disadvantage the recipient state. 
 
In other instances, the lack of coordination can also appear when the agencies do 
not possess a detailed mission outline. A work by Smith (2004) signified that a 
large number of peace-building projects did not have a clear strategy. From the 
336 projects examined, 55 percent of those missions suffer from what Smith 
defined as a “strategic deficit”.  
 
“If 55 percent of projects lack strategic connection, that does not 
mean the other 45 percent have clear and well worked out 
connections to broader strategies. In many cases, the links appear to 
be superficial and little more than pro forma.” (Smith 2004, p.43) 
 
Relating to the first challenge, another unavoidable challenge ison coordinating 
the agencies and the population within the state. When engaging in a state-
building mission, the international community will not only act with its 
counterparts but also with state elites and local groups with divergent interests. 
In his 2006 article, Rubin evaluated the implementation of state-building. He 
argued that actors involved in state-building usually try to “identify the „best 
practices‟ without asking for whom they are best” (p.184). The inability to read 
the situation is possible to even disrupt the effectiveness of the mission. 
Therefore, understanding the context within the recipient country is an essential 
aspect which needs addressing in every state-building mission. Chesterman 
(2005) stated that the biggest challenge of state-building intervention is not the 
difficulty of the mission itself, but rather the resistance from the population in 
which the mission is conducted (p.249). This challenge is quite easy to 
understand. In the international realm which largely still embraces its 
Westphalian values, intervention is still widely perceived as a taboo. At the same 
time, a post-conflict state is troubled with legitimacy-related problems.The 
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combination of these two problems can appear as a challenge for those who 
conduct the state-building mission. 
 
To respond toward the aforementioned problems, Schmeidl and Karokhail 
(2009) have warned the state-builders against “being blind” of the local context 
in which the state-building operation is done. One big mistake of the state-
builders is failing to understand that reshaping a state—as well as maintaining its 
security—is not an instant work. The authors labeled such inaccurate approach as 
the “McDonaldisation of state-building” (p.69). Using the case of Afghanistan in 
2001, Schmeidl and Karokhail demonstrated how a state-building process which 
disregards its contextual setting ended up being counterproductive. Afghanistan 
is a country witha largely rural society. In 2001, the country had only 21.6% urban 
population. However, the state-building approach adopted by the operators was 
largely centralized in Kabul, resulting in the marginalization of the most Afghan 
population. They criticized this approach as most of the Afghan population 
“interact with the state institutions at the provincial and district levels”. On the 
other hand, the state-builders seemed to dismiss that diversity and the existence 
of the society were also the features of Afghanistan, trying to build the state “from 
scratch”. 
 
“Thus, Afghanistan was modeled according to the presidential 
system of the US (organized around the figurehead of President 
Karzai), when in fact, its regional and cultural diversity may 
perhaps rather have called for a parliamentary system à la federal 
Germany or canton-orientated Switzerland.” (Schmeidl 2009, p.70) 
 
Highlighting this problem, another article by Nixon (2007) reinforced that 
notion. He also showed that the failure state-building in Afghanistan was caused 
by the failure of the operators to formulate the end target. In the case of 
Afghanistan, different donor countries were given different responsibilities, for 
instance: Germany was mandated to manage the police, the United States for the 
army, Italy for the judiciary, and the United Kingdom for counter-narcotics 
missions. While some of those aspects have cross-cutting interests, such division 
of responsibilities had eventually slowed down the progress, thus creating “a 
disjuncture between long-term state-building goals and the political short-term 
imperatives” (p.9-10). 
 
During the process, virtually all state-building process is mainly concerned with 
the problem of legitimacy building. A conventional top-down process of state-
building is likely to even disrupt the condition within the borders. Barnett and 
Zurcher (2009) stated that legitimacy lies in “the willingness to comply with the 
government‟s decisions depends on whether they believe it is legitimate” (p.28). 
To be perceived as legitimate actions, it is important for state-builders to 
understand the societal context of the targeted state.  
 
As a solution, state-builders can try to embrace the local actors in the process of 
state-building. The 2011 case of Somaliland provides us with a good instance of 
how inclusiveness can result in the success of a state-building project. Somaliland 
is an unrecognized state within the boundaries of internationally-recognized 
Somalia. Authors like Upsall (2014) and Phillips (2016) highlighted how the 
accomplished state-building of Somaliland was largely caused by the bottom-up 
approach embraced by the agencies involved. Somaliland has been constructed by 
different clans as the source of legitimacy, thus, the key of Somaliland‟s success 
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lies in how the outside forces limit their involvements in domestic affairs, thus 
providing local actors more space to consolidate power. Another example of 
peace-building in Aceh, Indonesia, is also a good practice. Even though not 
necessarily a state-building project, the inclusive approach which was displayed 
by the agencies had helped the consolidation process to occur smoothly. Before 
reaching an agreement in 2005, the Aceh peace process had been hindered for 
many years by the centralistic military dictatorship in Indonesia. However, as the 
power shifts toward a more reformist regime, the Indonesian government opened 
the channel for the rebel groups to consolidate peace by involving actors like local 
elites and civil society (Wandi and Patria 2015, p.6). The peace talks ended with 
Aceh being granted more autonomy, and the Indonesian government offered 




Yielding future strategies, which can avoid a constraining comfort zone for the 
recipient state, is another necessary aspect to be considered. State-building 
missions, like almost everything in this world, will not last forever. As a 
consequence, it is necessary that state-building agencies should provide 
sustainability once the mission has been done. In other words, the next challenge 
is related to providing a precondition which enables the recipient to thrive 
evenafter the mission has been concluded. Moss et.al. (2006), as well as Francois 
and Sud (2006), underlined this problem through their articles. Two prevalent 
exit strategy issues mainly circulate among the problem of aid-dependency and 
creating a situation conducive to democracy promotion. 
 
It is understandable that aid is certainly an important aspect of the process of 
state-building. An effective aid allocation can help the previously conflict-ridden 
areas to rebuild its facilities, as well as to provide a basic financial foundation to 
improve the quality of life. However, research was done by Moss et.al. (2006) 
warned us that certain types of the donor can potentially undermine the process 
of state-building. They derived this idea from the classic concept in the 
developmental studies called the “resource curse”, which imply that the 
abundance of natural resources can somehow discourage a country to put 
institution strengthening as their priority. At the same time, the abundance of 
resources can also make countries less inclined to “create a social contract with 
the population” (Moss et.al 2006, p.4). The same thing happens when an 
overwhelming amount of aid was injected into a fragile state. They dubbed this 
condition as the “aid-institutions paradox” when the existence of aids has the 
backlashing effect to even weaken the government‟s developmental program. 
 
Khan and Hoshino (1992) were notablefor their study on the impact of foreign aid 
toward the fiscal behavior of underdeveloped countries. They suggest that foreign 
aid “affects both the expenditure and the revenue side of the recipient 
government in the less-developed countries” (p.1486). In their findings, it has 
been concluded that governments in such countries tend to assume foreign aid as 
another source of income, thus leading to more governmental spending. The 
similar argument offered by Heller and Gupta (2002). They argue that as the 
income is getting more reliant on the external assistance, a fiscal uncertainty is 
likely to occur. This factor is worsened by the unpredictable nature of such aid. 
Consequently, the state cannot easily arrange long-term public service planning 
(p.18). 
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Another challenge with aid is how to make the host government more 
accountable. A study by Alesina and Weder (1999) also indicated that there had 
been a connection between the amount of aid and the level of corruption of the 
recipient country. The data being used was extracted from five different sources, 
namely the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the World Development 
Report (WDR), Standard and Poor‟s, the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Transparency International, and the World Competitiveness Yearbook. From 
their findings, it was suggested that most of the foreign aid went to the corrupt 
regimes, making the initial aim of such aid being ineffective. However, these 
findings should not discourage donors to participate in state-building. Rather, 
this issue should be addressed as a challenge for donors, governments, and civil 
society to work together in order to increase the effectiveness of such assistance.  
 
During the timeline, the next exit strategy challenge is to create a sustainable 
institution as a part of state-building. Paris (2004) argued that fragile states are 
vulnerable to “five pathologies”: (1) the problem of non-liberal groups within the 
civil society; (2) the opportunistic behaviour of „ethnic entrepreneurs‟ who garner 
political support by exploiting intercommunal distrust; (3) the risk that elections 
may serve as focal points for destructive societal competition; and (4) the danger 
posed by local saboteurs who may win; and (5) the disruptive effects of economic 
liberalisation. Such pathologies occur as fragile states are usually lacking in a 
peaceful dispute settlement mechanism within its society (pp.159-168).  
 
In the meantime, the authoralso suggests that building democracyshould not be 
the most immediate agenda in the case of state-building. Rather, the author 
agrees with Paris (2009) that a solid project of institutional revitalization should 
be prioritized before democratization. Paris refers to this concept as “Institution 
before Liberalisation” (IBL). Francois and Sud (2006) supported this argument, 
implying that democratization is not a one-size-fits-all type of governmental 
system. Moreover, democratization can even be dangerous when a state “cannot 
deliver on its basic responsibilities, such as physical protection for the citizens, 
and improvements for their standard of living” (p.148). A unique study by Ross 
(2006) even proposed that imposing democracy in poor countries is not a 
preferable choice, as the recipient country will face a dilemma between informing 
the voters or allocating budgets on health and welfare. Instead of trying to 
liberalize the fragile state, agencies which engage in the state-building process 
should invest more in rebuilding the capacity of the state to perform its basic 
services for the citizens. Strengthening institutions can also help in answering the 




As the concluding point of this article, the author reasserts that it is important to 
understand different challenges which may occur in the process of state-building. 
As a humanitarian mission which stems from a noble idea, state-building should 
be undertaken in a professional manner to ensure its success. There are several 
challenges to state-building which we have discussed.  
 
Notably, the first challenge is on coordination. This first challenge is related to 
the agency problem, like how international community coordinates themselves 
with their counterparts, as well as with the local elites and population within the 
recipient state borders. Second, it is also important to consider thoroughly the 
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challenge of an exit strategy. State-building missions should always result in the 
capability restoration of the recipient state to perform its basic functions. 
 
In conclusion, state-builders need to invest in programs which can avoid the 
recipient state from being aid-dependent, and at the same time, state-builders 
should also prioritize on building the institutions first rather than trying to 
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